). However, there is very little work on how this regulation is achieved behaviorally. From our data it seems that three separate behavioral acts are required to ensure that the group message is successfully secured. There may be something about
While we know much about the causes of aggression, we know surprisingly little about how aggression leads to violence or how violence is controlled. To explore the micro-regulation of violence we present a systematic behavioral analysis of footage from closed-circuit television (CCTV) surveillance of public spaces. Using 42 incidents (involving 312 people) we compared aggressive incidents that ended in violence with those that did not. Behaviors of protagonists and third-parties were coded as either escalating or conciliatory acts, and the resulting interaction sequences examined. Results show that third-parties are more likely to conciliate than escalate violence, and that this tendency increases as group size increases. We reveal a pattern of third-party behaviors that prevent aggression from becoming violent, with conciliatory behavior more successful when carried out by multiple third-parties than by a single intervener. We conclude by emphasizing the importance of collective third-party dynamics in understanding conflict resolution. The Role of Group Size and Collective Action in the Micro-Regulation of Violence As the eminent ethologist and primatologist Frans de Waal argues (1989; 2000) , when it comes to violence we know more about how aggression starts than how it is stopped, or kept under control. For example, research suggests that violence may result from the release of aggressive energy that has built up endogenously (Lorenz, 1967) , the failure of parental control (Tremblay, 2006) , or an adaptive function that facilitates sexual selection (Archer, 2009 ). In contrast, there is little research examining what happens after aggression begins in terms of how aggressive situations become, or are prevented from becoming, violent. Analyses of performance in military environments have shed some light on this issue by suggesting that the transition from aggression to violence is not easy or automatic (Collins, 2008; Grossman, 1996) . According to this work, for aggression to escalate into violence, important barriers need to be overcome. In this paper we will argue that one of these barriers is the tendency of third-parties to favor de-escalation over escalation in aggressive situations. We will show that this de-escalation tends to increase as group size increases. Finally, we will suggest that violence is not a result of individual deregulation in the presence of others, but rather the result of the failure of third-parties to act in a collective and coordinated fashion.
In attempting to explain the causes of violence, psychological theories tend to be a combination of the personological and the situational (Anderson & Bushman, 2002) . The assumption seems to be that aggression lurks below the surface of the individual, and that situational 'stressors' (e.g., crowding, Kumar & Ng, 2001;  temperature, Anderson, 1989) Third-Parties, Violence and Conflict Resolution 4 Waal, 2000) argues that what is most important about the transition from aggression to violence is that it occurs within a particular social context. In order to understand violence situated in this context, it is necessary to understand how aggression is controlled or escalated by those who are involved in the situation, and how reconciliation is achieved after violence has occurred. De Waal refers to this process as 'natural conflict resolution' (Aureli & De Waal, 2000; De Waal, 2000) .
Much of the animal research on conflict resolution focuses on the relationship between individuals who are directly involved in aggression and violence (Aureli & De Waal, 2000) . However, there is a smaller literature on 'third-party policing' (Flack, De Waal, & Krakauer, 2005; Flack, Girvan, De Waal, & Krakauer, 2006) which explores how individuals in the wider community contribute to the regulation of aggression in groups. This work points to the key role played by third-parties in the control of violence in social contexts. Third party interventions seem to work best in animal societies where there are a few powerful individuals with a recognized right to arbitrate, and work least well in societies where many individuals compete for dominance.
This idea that third-parties act to control violence contrasts with the traditional social psychological account of the impact of others on human violence. Traditional research argues that the presence of third-parties leads to de-regulation in individual's behavior (Zimbardo, 1969; Deiner, 1980) , and increasing group size results in antisocial and violent behavior (Mullen, 1986) . However, more recent research has begun to suggest that third-parties can promote pro-social as well as anti-social behavior (Postmes & Spears, 1998) . For example, a series of studies by Levine and colleagues (Levine & Crowther, 2008; Levine, Cassidy, & Jentzsch, 2010) show that group size can facilitate or inhibit pro-social behavior depending on the salience of Similarly, observations of crowd behavior show that, even when violence does occur, the nature of the violence is shaped by the norms and values of the group, and the spread of the violence is limited by the boundaries of the group identity (Reicher, 1987) . There is even evidence of group members acting to stop others from behaving violently if that behavior is seen to contravene the values of the group (Reicher 1987; Stott, Hutchinson, & Drury, 2001 ). The possibility of group-level regulation of behavior is also supported by evidence from the more rarefied environment of laboratory research on group altruism (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003) and from evidence of third party 'altruistic punishment ' in sequential public goods games (Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, & Richerson, 2003; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr & Gächter, 2002) .
Individuals have been shown to act in ways that are personally costly and bring no direct or indirect reward, in order to regulate group norms and 'punish' normviolating individuals. These altruistic punishment behaviors even occur when there is no reputational advantage to be gained from intervening, or even no expectation of future interaction with the subject being punished. This evidence seems to suggest a natural predilection for third-party intervention within group contexts. Third-Parties, Violence and Conflict Resolution 6 much more about conflict resolution in animal communities as a result (Aureli, Cords, & van Schalk, 2002; De Waal, 2000; Silk, 2002) . Where human conflict resolution has been studied, the focus has been on the development of conflict resolution skills (e.g., in children, Verbeek, 2008) or the longer-term resolution of marital or relationship conflict (Gottman, 1994) , rather than on violence itself.
An opportunity to study the micro-dynamics of human conflict resolution has emerged from the modern proliferation of public space, closed-circuit television (CCTV) surveillance in towns and cities in the United Kingdom. It is estimated that there are more than 4.2 million CCTV cameras in the United Kingdom -1 for every 14 members of the population -and almost every town and city centre has a system (Murakami Wood, Ball, Graham, Lyon, Norris, & Raab, 2006) . For the purposes of this paper we studied episodes of public aggression captured on the same city-centre CCTV system. The data was collected by a small group of civilian CCTV operatives who were trained to record incidents of public aggression that were resolved short of violence or that that escalated into violence. To focus on violent behavior in the context of the group, the data only included incidents in which two protagonists fought in the presence of two or more third-parties.
Given that our aim was to explore the nature of real time conflict resolution, we examined three factors that might distinguish between episodes of aggression that ended in violence and episodes of aggression that did not. These included the potential impact of group size on the events, the patterns of aggressive and conciliatory behaviors, and the role played by different actors during the events. This clips contained an argument or fight between two people. In all but one of the cases these protagonists were male; iii) there were at least two third-parties; iv) clips contained a sequence of at least 20 behaviors by the protagonists and third-parties; v) incidents did not contain police officers, community wardens or door security personnel ('bouncers'). Of the 42 clips, 6 contained two third-parties (14.3%), 4 contained three third-parties (9.5%), 7 involved four third-parties (16.7%), three contained 8 third-parties (7.1%), two contained 9 third-parties, two contained 10 third-parties (4.8%), and one contained 12 third-parties (2.4%)(M = 5.4, SD = 2.5).
The clips contained a total of 312 participants. 
Coding of the CCTV Clips
Coding began by identifying the perpetrator, the target and the third-parties in each CCTV clip. The behavior of these actors was then coded to identify and assign discrete behaviors to one of two categories: escalatory behavior or conciliatory behavior (see Figure 1) To test the reliability of this coding, a trained PhD student coded 9 (21.4%) of the clips. Agreement was assessed as occurring when there was an accurate match between coders that fell within a one-second window. Agreement between the coders was 84% (Cohen's Kappa = .78). Disagreements in coders were resolved through discussion prior to analysis of the data.
Analyzing the Behavioral Sequences
To address our research question relating to the patterning of behaviors, we constructed a sequence of behavioral codes for each incident. For simplicity, these sequences retained the temporal order of the behaviors but not their exact timing (i.e., we used event sequences). To capture the contribution of different bystanders when their behaviors occurred after one another, we invoked a second 'Other Bystander' 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 A linear regression of the average difference between escalatory and conciliatory behaviors (escalatory minus conciliatory) regressed over group size was significant, r = -.31, F(1,40) = 4.17, p < .05. Group members tended to de-escalate rather than escalate violence, and they appeared to do so more frequently as group size increased. To explore the consequence of this tendency, we examined the relationship between group size and our dichotomous measure of conflict outcome. A logistic regression showed that group size predicted the severity of outcome, b = .362, SE = .17, Wald = 4.55, p < .05. Thus, the consequence of third-parties using more Figure 2 shows the odds ratios for the four turns of third-party behavior that follow escalatory behavior by the perpetrator. These ratios reflect the extent to which the proportion of escalatory behavior is higher (ratio above 1.00) or lower (ratio below 1.00) in severe violence incidents compared to minimal violence incidents.
Specifically, the ratio gives the odds of conciliatory over escalatory behavior in incidents with minimal violence, divided by the equivalent odds for incidents with severe violence outcomes. In other words, when more instances of conciliatory behavior occur for every instance of escalatory behavior within minimal violence incidents, the numerator of the odds ratio is greater than the denominator, which results in a ratio greater than 1.00. When the ratio of conciliatory to escalator behavior is higher in the severe violence incidents compared to the minimal violence incidents, then the denominator of the odds ratio is greater and the resulting ratio is less than 1.00. We tested the asymptotic significance of these odds ratio towards conciliatory behavior using Mantel-Haenszel Common odds ratio test (one-sided). 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 These data reveal an important group level dynamic. As can be seen in Figure   2 , there is little difference in the use of escalatory and conciliatory behaviors across the first two acts following perpetrator aggression. At the third act, however, when two separate interventions have already taken place, we see significant differences between incidents of minimal violence and severe violence. These differences are highlighted by bold font in Figure 2 . For all but one sequence of turns, incidents ending in severe violence were over 1.88 times more likely to have group members who used escalatory rather than conciliatory behavior in response to the two previous third-party interventions. The sequence that is the exception to this pattern (i.e., The numbers on the x-axis of Figure 3 are combinations of three single digits that indicate unique third party behavior. Thus, "111" denotes the intervention of one third-party on three successive occasions (i.e., three occurrences of '1'). The occurrence of a '2' within the triplet (e.g., "112") indicates the intervention of a There is a final way in which the actions of group members shaped the trajectory of the incidents. Examining data on who threw the first punch in each incident revealed a surprising tendency. Across the 42 incidents, perpetrators were responsible for 16 (53%) punches, all aimed at the victim; the targets were responsible for 4 (13%) punches aimed at the perpetrator; and, importantly, third parties were responsible for 10 (33%) punches, typically aimed at the protagonist (7 occasions). These data rule out the possibility that these incidents involve a group ganging up on a victim. Rather, it seems that groups sometimes use violence as an instrumental tool to stop perpetrators from continuing with their aggression.
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Discussion
What then does this micro-analysis of aggressive incidents tell us about the translation from aggression to violence? Our data suggests that, at a behavioral level, third-parties serve to inhibit rather than facilitate the likelihood of violence, and are 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 even more likely to do so as group size increases. This evidence that third-parties are more likely to act to de-escalate rather than escalate aggression stands in contrast to traditional psychological accounts of the role of groups and group size in violence.
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There is clear evidence that increasing the presence of third parties does not undermine the ability of the group to regulate, but rather strengthens its tendency to bring aggression under control. At the same time, the greater preponderance of conciliatory over escalatory behaviors provides support for De Waal's (2000) assertion that we need to understand violence in the context of natural conflict resolution. It is clear that aggressive behaviors are most likely to be met with attempts at conciliation.
Why then do third-parties intervene, especially when this kind of behavior can be personally costly, and can seem to be of little personal benefit? Here the concept of 'altruistic punishment' (Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, & Richerson, 2003; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr & Gächter, 2002) seems to have explanatory value. Thirdparties become involved in order to enforce the norm of a non-violent resolution, occasionally engaging in strategic violence of their own to 'punish' perpetrators who ignore clear messages to desist. However, there is one way in which our findings differ from those of the sequential public goods games experiments. In our data, nonviolent outcomes (our measure of successful altruistic punishment) are a function of three separate acts from three separate actors, rather than a single third-party intervention. This suggests that, while individuals may engage in altruistic punishment, successful group regulation may only result when this behavior is collective and coordinated.
A similar argument can be made in respect of the literature on 'third-party policing' amongst non-human primates (Flack, De Waal, & Krakauer, 2005; 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 & Krakauer, 2006) . In that literature, successful third-party policing is usually explained by the 'individual vigor' (Flack et al., 2005) of the animal who intervenes, and the power distribution across individuals in the group. Successful third-party policing occurs in animal societies where power is concentrated in the hands of the few, and the rest of society recognizes their right to arbitrate in disputes.
Our data does not allow for judgments of individual vigor or social power calculations amongst human actors. However, it is clear that successful conciliation seems to require more than the actions of a single, powerful intervener. When there is collective and coordinated intervention from three third-party actors, then the policing out of violence was more likely to be accomplished. Such evidence for collective regulation of public disorder is consistent with anthropological (Fox, 1978) and ethogenic (Marsh, Rosser, & Harre, 1978) evidence showing that third-parties to violence have an implicit understanding of the 'rules of disorder', and that these rules are important for the public good. It is also consistent with work on the importance of the role of social identities in shaping group behavior in violent situations (Stott & Reicher, 1998) . It is important to recognize some of the limitations of the data in this study.
For example, our sample did not allow us to draw comparisons across male and female actors, yet there is some evidence to suggest there may exist differences in how each gender engages in violence (Archer, 2009) . Similarly, many of the individuals in our footage will have consumed large amounts of alcohol (the CCTV clips were all collected between the hours of 10 pm and 4 am in the night-time leisure zone of the city). We have no way of knowing who consumed alcohol, nor how much they had consumed. The well-documented effects of alcohol on cognitive performance (Pernanen, 1991) may limit the generalisability of the findings.
However, even with these caveats in mind, an important finding remains.
Disinhibition as a result of alcohol consumption could be argued to increase the likelihood of aggressive behavior as well as a greater willingness to intervene in situations where others are behaving aggressively. Given that both these outcomes are possible, the fact that conciliation emerges more strongly is significant. It seems that, even in a context where alcohol leads to disinhibition, acts of human violence are subsumed within the group dynamics of conflict resolution. Of course it will be important to replicate these findings in more controlled conditions. However, if we are to understand not only how human violence starts, but also how it is kept under control, it is clear that we need to recognize the central role of collective third-party conflict resolution. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 behavior across the four acts that follow escalatory behavior by a perpetrator. The ratio was calculated as the odds of conciliatory over escalatory behavior in incidents with minimal violence divided by the equivalent ratio for incidents with severe violence outcomes. Thus, a ratio above 1.00 indicates that escalatory behavior is more likely to occur in incidents ending with severe violence than minimal violence. The asymptotic significance of the ratios towards conciliatory behavior is tested using Mantel-Haenszel Common odds ratio test (one-sided). '123' = a series of behaviors by three different third parties. For each composition, the significance of the difference between the number of conciliatory and escalatory behaviors was tested using a chi-square test. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
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